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Incentivizing Cadaver Organ Donors: How to Increase the Supply of Cadaver
Organ Donors among Residents of Illinois Wesleyan University
Abstract
Over 6,500 individuals died in 2012 waiting for an organ transplant in the United States. In the context of
economics, this phenomenon is called a shortage, and in the world of the affected, this shortage is the
difference between life and death. Ever since the passage of the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA),
which prohibits the sale of organs for human transplantation, economists, philosophers, public policy
experts, religious leaders, and others have debated the ethical and effective standing of the law.
Increasing the supply of organs by introducing monetary incentives to donors (suppliers) is a recent
development in the field of economics. The concept has met resistance on ethical and empirical grounds.
Regarding ethics, the use of monetary incentives has been criticized for potentially victimizing the poor,
leading to the advancement of a black market, and removing the critical role of altruism within society.
This paper does not undermine these valid concerns, and it recognizes the importance for the ethical
debate. In fact, a small portion of this paper is devoted to these considerations. However, the majority of
the paper focuses on empirical findings as they relate to the supply of organ donations.
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Incentivizing Cadaver Organ Donors:

How to Increase the Supply of Cadaver Organ
Donors among Residents of Illinois
Wesleyan University
Daniel Truesdale

I. Introduction
Over 6,500 individuals died in 2012 waiting
for an organ transplant in the United States. In the
context of economics, this phenomenon is called a
shortage, and in the world of the affected, this shortage is the difference between life and death. Ever since
the passage of the National Organ Transplant Act
(NOTA), which prohibits the sale of organs for human transplantation, economists, philosophers, public
policy experts, religious leaders, and others have
debated the ethical and effective standing of the law.
Increasing the supply of organs by introducing
monetary incentives to donors (suppliers) is a recent
development in the field of economics. The concept
has met resistance on ethical and empirical grounds.
Regarding ethics, the use of monetary incentives has
been criticized for potentially victimizing the poor,
leading to the advancement of a black market, and
removing the critical role of altruism within society.
This paper does not undermine these valid concerns,
and it recognizes the importance for the ethical debate. In fact, a small portion of this paper is devoted
to these considerations. However, the majority of the
paper focuses on empirical findings as they relate to
the supply of organ donations.
The empirical debate regarding the use of
monetary incentives to increase the supply of organs
has faced unique challenges due to inadequacy of
data. With the exception of Iran, China, and India,
monetary payments for organs are illegal, leading to a
limited quantity of data. As a result, discussion regarding the use of monetary incentives to increase the
supply of organs has remained theoretical. This paper
examines the impact of monetary incentives with
regards to organ supply in an empirical context. The
paper develops the research in the following format;

Section II provides a literature review on previous
scholarly endeavors regarding the use of monetary
incentives to increase the supply of organs, Section
III elaborates on the theoretical model utilized in the
research, Section IV restates the research question and
provides a stated hypothesis, Section V analyzes the
significance of the $30 incentive, Section VI elaborates
on the empirical model and if willingness to accept
the $30 fee waiver differs across individuals with different demographic characteristics, Section VII deliberates ethical considerations, and Section VIII delivers
a conclusion along with policy ramifications.
II. Literature Review
A.
Titmuss and Arrow
As previously mentioned, the debate surrounding the use of monetary incentives to increase
the supply of organs has remained in the theoretical
realm. Richard Titmuss (1971) was the first economist
to entertain the idea of offering monetary compensation for human tissue. Titmuss argued that monetary
incentives for organs would lead to market failure.
In particular, Titmuss saw monetary compensation,
specifically in blood procurement, as a health risk due
to the inclination of unhealthy individuals to partake
in the market. As Thorne restates Titmuss’s argument,
“One might infer that, in the absence of effective tests
for diseases like hepatitis, donated blood is of better quality because donors who are not paid for their
blood have no incentive to conceal their illnesses”
(Thorne, 2006, p. 1,342). In other words, offering
monetary incentives degrades the quality of blood
since unhealthy individuals, who before were not enticed to donate out of altruism, now maintain a monetary incentive to partake in the market. Thus, they
subject both donors and recipients to health risks.
Furthermore, Titmuss argued monetary incentives for
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human tissue would cause the number of altruistic
donations to wither thereby causing the net supply of
organs to decrease (Titmuss, 1971) since an altruistic
market and a monetary market could not coexist.
This axiom was founded on Titmuss’s assertion that
monetary markets deny individuals “the right to give”
(1971). Another economist, K.J. Arrow, fundamentally disagreed with Titmuss and questioned, “Why
should it be that the creation of a market in blood
would decrease the altruism embodied in giving
blood? I do not find any clear answers in Titmuss’”
(Arrow, 1972, p.350).

three months prior to donation, (b) a fixed transportation refund to cover commuting costs, (c) reimbursement for seven days during recovery, (d) five
years reimbursement of medical, work capability loss
and insurances, (e) reimbursement of five psychological consultations and treatments.

The removal of these disincentives is connected to increasing the supply of organs in Israel.
“Compared to previous years, in 2011 there was a significant increase in the number of deceased organ donors directly related to an increase in organ donation
rate (from 7.8 to 11.4 donors per million population),
According to Arrow, altruistic and nonin parallel to a signiﬁcant increase in the number of
altruistic individuals respond to different incentives. new registered donors” (Lavee, 2013, p. 780). While
Arrow’s model proposes altruistic donors respond to the aforementioned are removal of disincentives, the
exhortation, and non-altruistic individuals respond implementation of incentives is a similar, if not idento monetary incentives. Since the two distinct suptical, concept.
pliers respond to unique incentives, neither subset is
impacted by the introduction of an alternate incenA pseudo-incentivized program was utilized
tive.
in the state of Georgia until the year 2005. “Until
recently, the state of Georgia offered a $7 discount
Extended studies have investigated the debate on driver’s license registration fees to individuals
between Arrow and Titmuss. Leider and Roth’s rewho registered as organ donors. The discount was
search examined Americans’ approval or disapproval scrapped in 2005 as part of an overhaul of the driver’s
of a monetary market for organs. They concluded a license registration system. But in 2005, Georgia had
majority of Americans approve of a kidney market,
one of the highest registration rates for organ doespecially when the market is regulated by a third
nation in the country” (Howard, 2007, p. 30). The
party, specifically the government (2010). This con- program utilized in Georgia gives contextual support
clusion casts doubt on Titmuss’s concern of a mon- suggesting monetary payment could increase the supetary market withering away altruistic donations .
ply of organs.
B.
Case Studies
As previously mentioned, the absence of data regard- C. Socio-demographics
ing the use of monetary incentives to increase the
Scholars have researched how socio-demosupply of organs presents analytical issues. Although graphic characteristics could impact the supply of
there are few reliable studies that investigate the use organ donations among different subsets of a citiof monetary incentives, there are close approximazenry. The most substantial argument against the use
tions which offer limited insight. For instance, Ash- of monetary incentives is the concern of victimizing
kenazi, Stoler, Cohen, and Beyar (2013) investigated the poor. According to Nancy Scheper-Hughes, an
The Brain-Respiratory Death Law and The Organ
anthropologist who tracks global trade of human orTransplantation Law, and how the two laws have
gans, “the movement and flow of living donor organs
provided additional organs for the state of Israel.
-mostly kidneys- is from South to North, from poor
The latter implemented penalties for individuals
to rich, from black and brown to white, and from
who travelled internationally to receive an organ and female to male bodies” (Satel, 2008, p. 59). Furtherwere then later reimbursed by insurance companies more, a Washington Post journalist declared “comfor such transactions. In addition, the law works to
pensation for organs might exacerbate the differences
remove disincentives which previous organ donors
[between rich and poor] turning the poor into surgiencountered; (a) earnings loss reimbursement of 40 cal ward slaves or feudal donors for the rich” (Satel,
days based on the donor’s average income during the 2008, p. 59). Note the aforementioned concerns are
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in regard to living organ donations. This study intends to investigate the use of monetary incentives
to increase the supply of cadaver organ donations.
Although an ethical concern still exists, the degree of
sensitivity is reduced with cadaver organ donations.
In addition to socioeconomic status, Satel investigated different religious groups’ tolerance towards compensating organ donors. Focusing on Judaism, Islam,
and Catholicism, Satel argues Judaism is the most
receptive to a market for organs with Catholicism being the most resistant. As she states for Judaism,
“Many Jewish scholars accept the idea of rewarding
people for donating organs for transplantation. Rabbi
Shlomo Goren, the third Ashkenazi chief rabbi of Israel, writes that ‘the donation of a kidney in consideration of financial reward does not change its positive
characteristic’” (Satel, 2008, p. 158).

tion even more forcefully, saying it ‘strongly opposes
any regulated market for organ sales’” (Satel, 2008, p.
162).
As a result, Satel concludes Judaism is the most receptive towards a monetary market for organs, while the
Catholic faith is the most resistant.
D.

Recent Endeavors
The following studies extend from the assumption that monetary incentives can be utilized to
increase the supply of organs. Specifically, the following authors investigated the market equilibrium price,
which would be needed to remove the organ shortage
among living donors. Becker and Elias utilized estimated values to predict the cost of kidneys and livers.
They concluded “that monetary incentives could increase the supply of organs for transplant sufficiently
to eliminate the large queues in the organ market,
In regards to Islam, Satel acknowledges
and it would do so while increasing the overall cost
the complexity within the religion. She notes most
of transplant surgery by no more than 12%”(Becker
Islamic scholars condemn the sale of organs because and Elias, 2007 p. 3). They estimated the cost of living
Allah is believed to own the human body. Therefore, kidneys and livers by “computing how much addihumans are not granted the right to sell organs they
tional income or market consumption an individual
technically do not possess. However, Satel uncovered will require to be indifferent between selling an organ
that a majority of Muslim scholars approve of such
or not” (Becker and Elias, 2007, p. 9). Thus, contransactions, if the alternative is death. Satel noted,
cluding the average cost for a kidney and liver were
“For example, a survey of thirty-two Muslim scholars $160,000 and $335,000 respectively. However, these
found uniform agreement that organ trading is not
figures include the entire cost of the procedure, which
permissible, yet 68.7 percent of them made an excep- means the aforementioned is both the price of the
tion if the only alternative was death” (Satel, 2008,
organ and the cost of the operation. In addition, the
p. 159). Although this exception varies throughout
authors relied on estimated values and utilized interthe religion, there exists a strong presence within the national comparisons with Iran and India to compute
faith of Islam to tolerate monetary compensation for the aggregate cost.
organ donations, specifically when confronted with
death.
One potential downfall in utilizing international comparisons is that it subjects the researcher to
Catholicism, according to Satel, is the most
national norms, which are not universal. For instance,
resistant to a monetary market for organs. Although the Iranian government has outlawed monetary
individual leaders and scholars within the religion
compensation for cadaver organs on the grounds that
have made attempts to humanize the monetary mar- it violates the Koran. Although an admirable attempt,
ket, the overall temperance of the Catholic Church
utilizing estimates and international comparisons to
towards a market-based system is negative.
compute market price equilibrium for living organs
“The Catholic consensus position endorses Pope John subjects the researcher to cultural variation in the
Paul II’s opposition to the commercialization of hudata.
man organs. The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops issued a directive asserting that living
Professor Frank Adams (1999) utilized a surdonor transplantation is acceptable, ‘but economic
vey design method to investigate the market clearing
advantages should not accrue to the donor.’ The Naprice needed to eliminate a market shortage. Adams
tional Catholic Bioethics Center has stated the posigathered original data from 392 students attending
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Auburn University. The survey contained 20 questions ranging from demographic enquiries to questions regarding an individual’s payment of schedule
for living organs. Essentially, students were asked at
what price they would be willing to sell their organs.
Professor Adams concluded the market clearing price
for kidneys and liver organs is $1,000. However, a
bias exists in Adams’s research because the surveyed
sample is not representative of the entire population.
College students tend to be more liberal with regard
to organ donation when compared to the entire population, which may cause the market clearing price
predicted by Adams to be artificially low. Professor
Adams’s work, along with Howard’s, illustrates the degree of difficulty in computing a market equilibrium
price for organs due to an inadequate amount of data.
Despite empirical fallacies, Thorne acknowledges that
a vast majority of economists recognize the absence
of a market has led to a quantity shortage. “What
economists agree on nearly universally is that the ban
on an organ market must necessarily cause shortages
and other inefficiencies” (Thorne, 2006, p. 1,341).

the assertion that altruistic donations will exist after
the introduction of monetary incentives and that the
quality of the organs will remain constant. As Titmuss expressed in the blood procurement example,
the quality of the good may deteriorate in the market,
since individuals now have an incentive to hide any
deficiencies. Second, the model assumes there are no
costs associated with altruistic organ donations. The
model also treats individuals on a dichotomous scale;
either as altruistic or non-altruistic. There is reason
to believe the introduction of monetary incentives
might turn altruistic donors into non-altruistic individuals. Even though the overall number of cadaver
organs might increase, the quantity of altruistic donors could wither. Despite the criticisms, this paper
will use the theoretical construct of the Pindyck and
Rubinfeld model.

This research makes alterations to the Pindyck
and Rubinfeld model. Specifically for the residents of
Illinois, this paper will investigate the effectiveness of
waiving a $30 driver’s license fee. Although a similar
concept to a payment of schedules, the incentivized
E.
Illinois Driver’s License Fee and Definitions program is unique. For one, respondents are trading
Currently in Illinois, persons 21-60 years of age must a future commodity, which carries a level of uncerpay a $30 fee when they receive and/or renew their
tainty with regards to the transaction. In addition,
driver’s license (Illinois Department of Motor Vehi- unlike the payment of schedules system utilized by
cles).This paper examines the possibility that waiving Adams, the incentive program is “take it or leave it.”
the $30 fee with the intention to entice organ dona- Respondents only have one avenue to sell their cadavtion will change a significant portion of non-donors er organs and it is through the Illinois Department
into donors.
of Motor Vehicles (DMV) . Future research might
wish to explore how a specific incentivize program,
III. Theory
such as the one presented in this paper, compares to
The theoretical construct for this research
an unregulated market where individuals are able to
is based on the Pindyck and Rubinfeld supply and
negotiate the price of their cadaver organs. However,
demand model. The model theorizes that an increase this research only examines the effectiveness of the
in the price of an organ should increase the quantity $30 incentive.
supplied. The Pindyck and Rubinfeld model contains
the following assumptions: (a) the quality of the
Finally, the model utilized in this research
organs will be the same whether sold or donated, (b) will alter the demand curve for organs. The Pindyck
altruists will continue to donate even after a market is and Rubinfeld model assumes demand for organs is
introduced (Note: this directly contradicts Titmuss), neither perfectly elastic nor inelastic (Pindyck and
(c) when markets are banned, not only is the cost
Rubinfeld, 1989); however this paper assumes perfect
of the good zero, but no other costs are required to
inelasticity for organs demanded. This assumption is
procure the donated good, (d) nothing can be done shared with Adams. Assuming a perfectly inelastic
to increase the supply of organs when markets are
demand curve will simplify any empirical findings.
banned (Pindyck and Rubinfeld,1989).
Graph 1 provides the theoretical model.
The above-mentioned assumptions have received criticism from Titmuss, specifically regarding
The Park Place Economist, Volume XXIII
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IV. Hypothesis and Research Question
This paper examines the impact of monetary
incentives on cadaver organ supply. Using original
data, collected from a survey design method, this
paper investigates the following questions; 1) Will a
specific incentivized program, for instance a waiver of
a driver’s license fee for $30, increase the supply of cadaver organs in Illinois? And, 2) Are individuals from
certain socio-demographics more likely to respond to
the $30 incentive? This paper makes the following hypotheses: ceteris paribus (a) the incentive of the $30
fee waiver for Illinois residents will increase the supply of cadaver organs significantly, among students
at Illinois Wesleyan University (IWU) and (b) this
response is constant across all socio-demographic
groups.
V. Data
Empirical data regarding the use of monetary
incentives to increase the supply of organs is nonexistent, except in China, India, and Iran. For this reason,
this research relied on a survey design method to
collect original data. An IRB approved, online survey
was randomly administered to students at Illinois
Wesleyan University (IWU). The students had from
September 1, 2014 to October 20, 2014 to complete
the online survey. Overall, 156 students partook in
the survey and 130 student responses were utilized in
this research. The remaining 26 were removed since
these respondents did not possess an Illinois driver’s
license, and therefore could not be enticed by the $30
fee waiver.
The method utilized in this research is similar
to the one employed by Adams when he surveyed
students attending Auburn University. Similar to
Adams, there is a bias in utilizing college students
as the sample. Students attending universities are
younger compared to the general population and
typically display liberal attitudes towards organ donation, surely unrepresentative of the entire population.
This research differs from Professor Adams, because
it investigates monetary incentives as they relate to
increasing the supply of cadaver organs, rather than
living organs. In addition, this research investigates
the effectiveness of a specialized incentivized program, a take-it or leave-it mechanism.

There are two reasons for studying the phenomenon in this context. First, there exists a lack of
empirical data regarding the use of monetary incentives to increase the supply of cadaver organs in the
realm of economics, thus allowing this research to
add substantial knowledge to the discipline. Second,
utilizing monetary incentives to acquire living organs
entails policy and ethical ramifications, which are
beyond the scope of this study. This paper recognizes
there are policy complications for cadaver organs, but
such concerns are not the focus of this paper and are
not as substantial.
In addition, the survey for this research was
designed to study the impact of a particular incentivized program: the $30 driver’s license fee waiver. The
respondents were grouped based on specific answers
during the survey. First, respondents were separated
into two subsets; those possessing an Illinois driver’s
license and those not possessing an Illinois driver’s
license. Next, respondents were asked if they were
cadaver organ donors. Depending on their response,
respondents from both subsets were asked slightly
different questions. Respondents with an Illinois
driver’s license and who were already cadaver organ
donors were asked,
“In Illinois, persons 21-60 have to pay a $30 fee when
they get their driver’s license. With this in mind, if the
Illinois Department of Motor Vehicles was to waive
your fee, only if you became an organ donor, would
you have been more enticed to become an organ
donor in order to cancel the $30 fee?”
Likewise, Illinois respondents who were not already
cadaver organ donors were asked,
“In Illinois, persons 21-60 have to pay a $30 fee when
they get their driver’s license. With this in mind, if the
Illinois Department of Motor Vehicles was to waive
your fee, only if you became an organ donor, would
you then become an organ donor to cancel the $30
fee?”
These questions allow the effectiveness of
an incentive program, such as the $30 fee waiver,
to be examined. The primary focus of this paper is
to investigate the effectiveness of the $30 waiver for
non-organ donors. A completed reproduction of the
survey is located in the Appendix.
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A.

Summary Data
The following provides summary statistics
from the survey administered to the IWU student
population. Table 1 provides insight into the total
number of individuals possessing an Illinois Driver’s
license and the distribution of cadaver organ donors
and non-donors. Table 2 provides a summary description of gender and Table 3 provides summary
data for different religious affiliations across the
sample.

the null hypothesis that the difference in gender
proportions to be a cadaver organ donor is insignificant. The same procedure is utilized to discern if a
difference exists among different religious groups and
probability of being an organ donor. The table below
explores the phenomenon. From Table 7, there exists
no significant difference between religious affiliation
and likelihood of being a cadaver organ donor.

After discovering insignificant differences in
the likelihood of being a cadaver organ donor among
This paper investigates how to entice the indi- gender and different religious groups, this paper
investigates if the $30 incentive can have a significant
viduals who are not already organ donors (57 individuals) to become donors. This analysis is furthered impact in increasing organ donors among the differby analyzing subsets of the IWU student population. ent subsets. Before analyzing the significance of the
For instance, among the 50 men from the survey, 50% incentivized program, descriptive data alludes the
raw change in number when the monetary incentive
(25) are already organ donors, while 50% (25) are
not. Among 81 women, 60.5% (49) are already organ is presented. According to Table 8, both men and
women were responsive to the $30 incentive. Table 8
donors, while 39.5% (32) are not. From observing
provides a summary.
Table 4, women are more likely to be organ donors
compared to men.
When examining different religions, it apThe number of organ donors across religious pears Catholics, Protestants, and the “other” categories were enticed by the $30 incentive. Surprisingly,
affiliations appears to differ. Recall from the literaCatholics are also quite likely to respond to the incenture review, Catholics are the most resistant to betive, which contradicts earlier assumptions made in
ing organ donors. However, the survey data for this
the literature review.
study illustrates the “other” category as being the
most resistant. Although, the differences between the
To test if the $30 incentive has a significant
three religious subsets in terms of organ donation
are small, it appears Protestants are most likely to be impact amongst the different subsets, this paper
utilizes a one sample t-test, as the same sample of reorgan donors, while Catholics are the second most
spondents is studied before and after the introduction
likely. The “other” category consists of other major
religions as well as individuals not identifying with a of the stimuli. This research is testing the hypothesis
that there is not a statistical difference in the propormajor religion. This lack of distinction makes it diftion of “yes” responses before the introduction of the
ficult to analyze the results from the “other” subset.
$30 stimuli and after the stimuli is presented, utilizing
The results are shown in Table 5.
the identical sample. An additional cause for utilizing a one sample t-test compared to a two sample
VI. Significance Tests
t-test is because the number of cadaver organ donors
As is evident from the summary statistics,
is expected to increase once the monetary incentive
differences exist across gender and religious groups
is offered. This is an inference grounded in previin regards to organ donation. This section utilizes a
ous theoretical frameworks. Table 10 provides data
two-sample t-test to distinguish if such differences
indicating whether the $30 incentive had a significant
between the subsets are statistically significant. The
null hypothesis states the difference between the two impact on population as a whole whereas Table 11
looks at the individual subsets.
proportions is equal to “0”, and is thus insignificant.
The alternate hypothesis proclaims the difference in
Column 1 indicates which subset is being
proportions of the two subsets is statistically significant. Table 6 displays the results for gender. Since the studied and the number in parentheses under the
name indicates the total number of individuals in the
p-value is greater than 0.05 this paper fails to reject
The Park Place Economist, Volume XXIII
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specific subset. Column 2 presents the total number of individuals from the specific subsets who are
already cadaver organ donors before the introduction of the $30 incentive. Both the percentage and
the raw number are included. Column 3 contains the
new percentage of individuals who become organ
donors due to the introduction of the $30 incentive.
The equation below the percentage is the equation
utilized to obtain the new raw number of cadaver
organ donors. The bolded number indicates the value
being added to the original. Utilizing a one-sample
t-test, Column 4 tests to see if the difference between
the original proportion and the new proportion of
cadaver organ donors is significant. Recall, the null
hypothesis claims the difference between the two proportions is insignificant, while the alternative hypothesis states the difference in proportions is significant.
Column 5 takes the total number from Column 3 and
adds half of the respondents who indicated a maybe
(uncertain) to becoming an organ donor due to the
introduction of the $30 incentive. Column 6 tests to
see if the difference from the original proportion and
the new proportion is significant. The reason for adding half of the respondents who indicated maybe is
grounded in the belief that some of these individuals
only require additional information in order to induce them to become organ donors. Remember, the
individuals from the maybe category were once a no
to being a cadaver organ donor, but after the introduction of the monetary incentive they switched to
a maybe. The following section examines the significance among the entire sample of respondents who
were not cadaver organ donors.
It appears when analyzing the population as
a whole; the $30 dollar incentive is first significant at
the 95% confidence interval level when only including respondents who indicated yes to the $30 dollar
incentive and comparing the new percentage of organ
donors with the original percentage. When half of
the respondents who were uncertain about becoming
organ donors from the $30 incentive are included,
the difference in the percentage is significant at the
99% confidence interval level. This result supports
the hypothesis that the $30 dollar incentive program
has a significant impact on increasing the proportion
of organ donations. This is critical to the research
because it supports the idea that the $30 incentive
can have a significant impact in increasing the overall

number of cadaver organ donors. Although this data
set is only cross-sectional and utilizes a small sample,
this finding gives positive empirical evidence that a
small monetary incentive can increase the proportion
of organ donors among a population, in this case the
students of IWU.
Next, the research investigated if differences
existed across demographics in likelihood to respond
to the $30 incentive. The procedure utilized in Table
11 is identical to the procedure used in Table 10. The
results are presented in the Appendix. The results
presented in the table are competing. For men, the introduction of the $30 dollar incentive was significant
at the 90% confidence interval when adding just the
yes group and remained significant at this level when
including half of the maybe respondents. For women,
the $30 incentive was significant first at the 90% confidence interval when only adding the yes group but
then became significant at the 95% confidence interval when half of the maybes were added. Among
Catholics, the increase in proportion was not significant when only observing the increase in proportion
from the yes’s but then became significant at the 90%
confidence interval when half of the maybe’s were
added. Among Protestants, the increase in proportion of organ donors was insignificant both for when
only the yes’s were added and when half of the maybes were added. Finally, among respondents from the
“other” religious category, the increase in proportion
was significant at the 90% confidence interval, both
for when only the yes’s were added and when half of
the maybes were added to the total.
VII.

Multivariate Empirical Model
Due to the exploratory nature of this research
and the relatively low number of cases collected from
the survey, executing an empirical model was a difficult task. Even still, examining whether different
demographic characteristics impact a respondent’s
probability of accepting the $30 monetary incentive was tested. This section of the paper explores
if willingness to accept the $30 monetary incentive
is impacted by socio-demographic factors including gender, religious affiliation, and knowledge of an
individual on dialysis.
The first two independent variables are selfexplanatory, but the third requires clarification. The
reason for including a measurement indicating if a re-

The Park Place Economist, Volume XXIII

90

Truesdale
spondent knows an individual on dialysis is the belief
that knowing someone on dialysis creates sympathy
to the cause, increasing the likelihood of accepting
the $30 incentive. Table 12 provides information regarding the regression. Since the dependent measurement, accepting the $30 incentive and becoming an
organ donor, is dichotomous in nature, this research
utilized a binary logistic regression to test if the independent variables have a significant impact on the
dependent variable.
The results from Regression One are located
in Table 13. When all the independent variables were
observed in concert with each other (Column 1), it
appeared neither variable was significant. This may
be a result of the low number of cases present in the
survey sample. Columns 2 through 4 investigate if
each independent variable in isolation may have a
significant impact on increasing organ donations.
Again, all the independent variables in isolation were
insignificant. However, KNOWLEDGE_OF_DIALYSIS appeared to be the closest in significance. Again,
the independent variable is insignificant but perhaps
a larger sample size would support the theory that
knowing someone who is suffering through kidney
dialysis creates sympathy for the cause, thereby making them more benevolent to accept the $30 incentive.

work and sacrifice. Are they not sacrificing their bodies, and are we therefore not using their bodies like
a commodity? These ideas put forth by Satel offers a
unique insight.
The second argument stems from the idea
that compensating individuals will inherently lead to
a black market. Satel (2008) argues it is the absence
of a regulated, legal market, that there exists a black
market. The quantity shortage of organs has forced
individuals to face an ultimatum, either suffer or
obtain an illegal organ. If compensating organ donors
can eliminate this market shortage, does it not reason
that this should eliminate, not proliferate, a black
market?
Again, this section was not intended to answer all of the ethical concerns, but instead offer an
alternate view for those concerned with the normative analysis of compensating organ donations. No
matter how strong the empirical standing, ultimately
this policy will require political will and therefore
needs to address normative concerns.

IX. Conclusion
Overall, the findings in this paper are substantial. Most notably, discovering the $30 incentive
increases the proportion of organ donors on the campus of IWU is significant. This leads to the conclusion
that among college students, a small monetary incenVIII. Ethical Considerations
tive can entice non-organ donors to become cadaver
Although this paper analyzed the positive
donors. Therefore, the results support the original
significance of the $30 incentive program, it would be hypothesis.
incomplete if it did not mention the normative aspect
of incentivizing organ donations. This section does
However, this paper was unable to discover
not display an exhaustive list of ethical concerns reif willingness to accept the monetary incentive was
garding the sensitive issue, but instead highlights only impacted by socio-demographics. Future research
a few. In her work, When Altruism Isn’t Enough, Satel may wish to explore how the independent variables,
(2008) enumerates on the concerns of compensatgender, age, income, marital status, race, religion, etc.,
ing living organ donors. Although her topic of focus may impact the willingness to accept the monetary
is living organ donations, some of the arguments are incentive.
transferable to the cadaver organ debate. As Satel records, those opposed to compensating organ donors
A limitation of this research was that it was
embody the moral stance against treating the body
confined to the borders of IWU’s campus. The next
like a commodity. Although a noble stance, Satel
step in this research process is to investigate whether
argues society should reward individuals for noble
a small monetary incentive program, such as the $30
behavior. She relates the concept of paying soldiers
license fee waiver, has an impact on a larger group
for donating their bodies and livelihood in war time of individuals. I intend to continue this research and
and states it would be irrational not to pay soldiers
survey the City of Bloomington, Illinois. By surveying
(and policemen and firemen for that matter) for their a city’s entire population, the sample will be subject to
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greater variance in marital status, income, religion, as Lavee, J. J., Ashkenazi, T. T., Stoler, A. A., Cohen, J. J.,
well as other independent measures not captured on
& Beyar, R. R. (2013). Preliminary Marked
a college campus. These new measures will add validIncrease in the National Organ Donation Rate
ity to the model.
in Israel Following Implementation of a New
Organ Transplantation Law. American Jour-		
Discovering that a small incentive program
nal Of Transplantation, 13(3), 780-785.
entices citizens to become cadaver organ donors has
the potential to save lives. This paper kindled the dis- Leider, S., & Roth, A. (2010). Kidneys for sale: who 		
cussion of how 6,500 individuals died in 2012 due to
disapproves, and why? American Journal Of 		
an organ shortage. If $30 could have a significant imTransplantation: Official Journal Of The
pact in reducing the amount of these deaths, would it
American Society Of Transplantation And 		
not be worth it to implement such a program? ObviThe American Society Of Transplant
ously, before exerting the findings of this paper to the
Surgeons, 10(5), 1221-1227.
entire population, further research needs to investigate whether the $30 incentive is effective outside the Pindyck, R. S., & Rubinfeld, D. L. (1989). Microeco-		
campus of IWU. The findings in this paper are but
nomics. New York
a stepping stone to greater discoveries that have the
potential to save lives.
Satel, Sally L.. When altruism isn’t enough: the case 		
for compensating kidney donors. Washing-		
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Appendix
A.
Online Survey

Becker, G. S., & Elías, J. (2007). Introducing Incen-		 Monetary Market for Organ Donation
tives in the Market for Live and Cadaveric 		
You are invited to be a participant in a reOrgan Donations. Journal Of Economic
search study about monetary markets for organs. You
Perspectives, 21(3), 3-24.
were selected as a possible participant because you
are enrolled at Illinois Wesleyan University (IWU).
Collard, D. (n.d). Handbook of the Economics of 		 We ask that you read this document and ask any
Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity. Volume 1, 		 questions you may have before agreeing to be in the
Foundations: Volume 2, Applications,
study. The study is being conducted by student Daniel
Handbooks in Economics. Economics and 		 Truesdale and Professor Craig Broadbent of Illinois
Philosophy, 24(2), 265-271.
Wesleyan University.
DRIVER SERVICES. Fees. Retrieved October 15, 		
The purpose of this study is to examine if
2014.
monetary incentives could be utilized to increase the
supply of cadaver organs. The length of time you will
Howard, D. H. (2007). Producing Organ Donors. 		 be involved with this study is approximately 30 minJournal Of Economic Perspectives, 21(3), 25-		 utes, you will be asked to complete a survey.
36.
If you agree to participate, we will ask you to
Kaserman, D. L. (2006). On the Feasibility of Resolv- complete a list of questions from an online survey.
ing the Organ Shortage. Inquiry, (2). 160.
The records of this study will be kept private. The data
will be anonymous and only Professor Broadbent and
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How Cadaver Organ Donation Works: All lifesaving
efforts are made to save a person’s life without regard
to their status as an organ/tissue donor. It is only after
these efforts have failed and someone is declared dead
that recovery efforts begin. The staff at the hospital,
Your participation in this study is voluntary.
for which the individual is deceased, is not involved
Your decision whether or not to participate will not
with the recovery process and does not have access to
affect your current or future relations with Illinois
the Secretary of State Organ/Tissue Donor Registry.
Wesleyan University or any of its representatives. You When death occurs or is imminent, the hospital staff
have the right to refuse to participate or to withdraw contacts the organ procurement organization (OPO)
at any time without penalty or loss of benefits
to report the death. The OPO sends clinical staff to
At this time, you may ask any questions you have
the hospital if it is likely that donation is possible. The
about this study or about the informed consent pro- OPO contacts the Secretary of State’s donor registry
cess. If you have questions later, you may contact the hotline to find out if the person is listed in the regisresearcher(s) at dtruesda@iwu.edu.
try. If the person is in the registry, the trained OPO
staff will work with the family, explaining the process,
If you have questions or concerns regardgathering information and provide support. If he/she
ing this study and would like to speak with someone is not in the registry, family will be educated about
other than the researcher(s), you may contact Dr.
the process and asked for consent to donate. Each
Brian Brennan, Institutional Review Board Chair, Il- potential donor is evaluated to see what organs/tissue
linois Wesleyan University, at 309-556-3972,
can be recovered for transplantation. The number of
bbrenna1@iwu.edu.
organs/tissue recovered varies from person to person. The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS)
If you would like a copy of this form for your manages the list of patients waiting for transplants.
records please contact Daniel Truesdale and a form
A computer program matches donor organs with
will be emailed to you.
recipients based on certain matching criteria such
as blood and tissue type, height and weight, as well
I have read and understood the above expla- as how sick the patient is, how long they have been
nations, and my questions have been addressed. The waiting and distance from donor to patient. About 75
information that I provide will be used for research
percent of all organs go to local patients. Recovery is
purposes only. I understand that my participation is a surgical procedure where the donor is treated with
voluntary and that I may withdraw anytime without dignity and respect, and the body restored to allow
penalty. If I have any concerns about my experifor an open-casket visitation. All funeral and burial
ence in this study (e.g., that I was treated unfairly
or cremation options may take place after donation.
or felt unnecessarily threatened), I may contact the
In order to register as an organ donor in Illinois, you
researchers or the Chair of the IWU Institutional
must be at least 18 years old. **If you are younger
Review Board regarding my concerns. I voluntarily
than 18 years old, your parents, next of kin, or leconsent to participate in this research study. (By
gal guardians have the responsibility of making the
clicking “Yes” and advancing to next page, you agree decision about organ donation. When an individual
to the study).
registers, the organ donor registry will carry out their
wish to donate your organs and tissues upon your
Do you wish to participate in the online survey?
death. The individual’s family will NOT have to pay
o
Yes
any amount for the removal of your organs. Although
o
No
everyone is eligible for organ donation (regardless of
age, race, or medical history), medical professionals
Information on Organ Donation
make determinations whether the organs are suitable
There is an enormous need for organ donors for transplant once an organ donor has deceased.
throughout the United States. In 2012, more than
6,500 people died waiting for an organ transplant.
Daniel Truesdale will have access to the data. Any
sort of report that is published or presentation that is
given, will not include any individual specific information.
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Below is a list of the top myths regarding organ donation:
Doctors do not work with the same urgency
to save an individual’s life if they know their an organ
donor: Many people are concerned that if they sign
up to be an organ donor, they won’t get the same level
of care should they end up in a life or death situation.
However, this is not true. Your doctor is obligated to
have one singular aim: to save your life.

Are you married?
o
Yes
o
No
o
Prefer not to answer

If you are a registered donor, a doctor might
declare you dead before it’s appropriate: This is a
common myth that scares many people out of registering to donate. However, the opposite is actually
true. Organ donors are given more tests to determine
official death than those patients who haven’t agreed
to organ donation.

How many people, besides yourself, live in your
household?
o
0
o
1
o
2
o
3
o
4
o
5
o
More than 5

Doctors will take all of your organs, even if
you only want to donate one: You can specify which
organs you are willing to donate. Only the organ(s)
you identify will be donated. Organs are sold on the
black market: There are many urban legends involving frightening tales of organs being stolen and sold
for profit.
The process of donation is so complex and
medically involved that this is not viable in the U.S.
A transplant necessitates all of the following: Highly
trained doctors, modern healthcare facilities, matching of donors to recipients, other medical support.
We would like to ask a few questions about
you before we proceed to questions about organ donation.
All Questions
Year you were born
Race
o
o
o
o
o
o

African American/African/Black/Caribbean
Asian/Pacific Islander
Caucasian (Non Hispanic)
Hispanic/Latino
Native American
Prefer not to answer

Gender
o
Male
o
Female
o
Prefer not to answer

What is your personal aggregate annual income?
*Include income from all external factors: (Parents,
Guardians, Scholarships, Part-Time Job, etc.)
o
Less than $10,000
o
$10,000-$29,999
o
$30,000-$49,999
o
$50,000-$99,999
o
$100,000-$249,000
o
$250,000 or more
Are you a member of an organized religion?
o
Yes
o
No
o
Prefer not to answer
If yes, which organized religion are you a member of?
o
Protestant/Other Christian
o
Catholic
o
Mormon
o
Jewish
o
Muslim
o
Other non-Christian religion
o
Prefer not to answer
o
Not Applicable
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Organ Donation Questions
Do you know of a friend or relative who is on dialysis?
o
Yes
o
No
o
Prefer not to answer
Do you know of a friend or relative who has ever
been a organ donor?
o
Yes
o
No
o
Prefer not to answer
Do you know of a friend or relative who has ever
been a recipient of donor organs?
o
Yes
o
No
o
Prefer not to answer
Would you be offended by the purchase and sale of
cadaver organs, even if such transaction saved lives?
o
Yes
o
No
o
Do not know
Would you be offended by a government program
which would allow your organs to be removed at
death without your explicit permission?
o
Yes
o
No
o
Do not know
If yes, would you still be offended by a governmental
policy which would allow your organs to be removed
at death without your explicit permission, even if you
could prevent such removal by prefiling, prior to your
death, a statement denying such permission?
o
Yes
o
No
o
Do not know

Which organs would you be willing to donate after
you are deceased?
*Select “All” if you would donate all your organs
o
Heart
o
Lungs
o
Liver
o
Pancreas
o
Kidneys
o
Small Intestines
o
All
Which organs would you not be willing to donate
after you are deceased?
*Select “All” if you would not donate any of your
organs
o
Heart
o
Lungs
o
Liver
o
Pancreas
o
Kidneys
o
Small Intestines
o
All
Do you have a Illinois driver’s license?
o
Yes
o
No
o
Prefer not to answer
If yes to the last question, then the respondents followed this track:
Monetary Market for Organ Donation
Illinois Questions
If yes, do you know you can become a cadaveric organ donor through your driver’s license by
joining the First-Person Consent Organ/Tissue Donor Registry by submitting a form online, by calling
1-800-210-2106 or by visiting your nearest Secretary
of State facility.
o
Yes
o
No
Are you already a cadaveric organ donor?
*You can consult you Illinois Driver’s License to
verify if you are a cadaveric organ donor
o
Yes
o
No
o
Do not know
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If answered no or do not know, respondents were
asked the following:
Illinois Driver Incentive
In Illinois, persons 21-60 have to pay a $30
fee when they get their driver’s license. With this in
mind, if the Illinois Department of Motor Vehicles
was to waive your fee, only if you became an organ
donor, would you then become an organ donor to
cancel the $30 fee?
o
Yes
o
No
o
Do not know
If answered yes, respondents were asked the following:
Illinois Driver Incentive-For Donors
In Illinois, persons 21-60 have to pay a $30
fee when they get their driver’s license. With this in
mind, if the Illinois Department of Motor Vehicles
was to waive your fee, only if you became an organ
donor, would you have been more enticed to become
an organ donor in order to cancel the $30 fee?
o
Yes
o
No
o
Do not know
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